

IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JOHNSON COUNTY

Shelton Stromquist, et al.,	)	
	)	
Petitioners,	)	
	)	No. CVCV086873
vs.	)	
	)	RULING
State Historical Society of Iowa, et al.,	)	
	)	
Respondents.	)	

State Historical Society, Inc.,	)	
	)	
Petitioner,	)	
	)	No. CVCV087253
vs.	)	
	)	RULING
State Historical Society of Iowa, et al.,	)	
	)	
Respondents.	)	

Shelton Stromquist, et al.,	)	
	)	
Petitioners,	)	
	)	No. CVCV087307
vs.	)	
	)	RULING
Iowa Department of Administrative Services,	)	
	)	
Respondent.	)	

On this date, the Petitions for Judicial Review filed by the Petitioners in each of the above-captioned cases came before the undersigned for review. The Court finds a hearing on the Petitions is unnecessary. Having considered the file, relevant case law, and written arguments of counsel, the Court hereby enters the following ruling.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

All of these actions relate to the decision made by Respondents to close the research facility and archives of the State Historical Society that are located in Iowa City, Iowa. The cases were consolidated on February 20, 2026. The Court will set forth the factual and procedural history for each of the above-captioned matters, although the Court will consider the merits of the Petitions together for the purposes of this Ruling.

CVCV086873

Petitioners filed a Petition for Judicial Review in this action on September 26, 2025, describing themselves as a group of Iowa historians, archivists, donors, and community members who are challenging the decision of the State Historical Society of Iowa and the Iowa Department of Administrative Services to close the State Historical Society in Iowa City. Petitioners seek judicial review of the decision-making process regarding the closure, and in the Petition, contend there are two provisions of law violated by the closure decision. First, Petitioners argue that Iowa Code § 8A.707(2)(b) mandates that Respondents maintain an Iowa City research center. Second, Petitioners argue that Respondents' transfer of some collections is in violation of Iowa Code § 8A.711(1) because the law requires Respondents to use all donations in accordance with the desires of the donor if expressed. Petitioners assert Respondents have acted unlawfully for the purposes of Iowa Code chapter 17A, and the Court should declare that Respondents may not lawfully close the Iowa City research library; enjoin Respondents from closing the facility; and order Respondents to return all collections that were removed from the Iowa City research library in preparation for its closing.

An injunction was entered on October 23, 2025, pursuant to which Respondents were ordered not to remove any further documents, artifacts, or other related materials from the Iowa City research library. Petitioners were directed to petition to agency for a declaratory order, and further proceedings in this matter were suspended pending that action. The suspension of proceedings ultimately was lifted, the cases were consolidated, and the consolidated briefing on the merits of Petitioners' claims now has taken place.

CVCV087253

Petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Review on January 20, 2026. Prior to the Petition being filed with this Court, Petitioner State Historical Society, Inc. filed a Petition for Declaratory Order with the Iowa Department of Administrative Services (DAS). In that action, Petitioner sought a declaratory order finding that DAS has violated its statutory duties by (1) failing to maintain an archive in Iowa City under Iowa Code § 8A.707(2)(b), and (2) by moving collections out of Iowa City contrary to donor intent and in violation of Iowa Code § 8A.711(1). On December 22, 2025, DAS answered "no" to the first issue, and refused to answer the second issue. In the Petition filed with this Court, Petitioner seeks reversal of the DAS decision. Respondents have denied the allegations of the Petition that are adverse to them, and have set forth the following affirmative defenses: failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and given the appellate nature of Iowa Code chapter 17A judicial review, the Court may not rule on the merits of any questions posed in the underlying petition for declaratory order that Respondents declined to answer, and the Court can only determine whether Respondents acted reasonably in declining to answer, and remanding to the agency if not.

CVCV087307

Petitioners filed a Petition for Judicial Review on January 29, 2026. Prior to the Petition being filed with this Court, Petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Order with DAS. In that action, Petitioners sought answers to the following questions: (1) does DAS's closure of the Iowa City research library violate DAS's duty to maintain a research library in Iowa City as set

forth in Iowa Code § 8A.707(2)(b), and (2) does DAS's relocation and/or deaccession of donated items intended to remain in Iowa City violate DAS's duty to use gifts in accordance with the desires of the donors, as set forth in Iowa Code § 8A.711(1). On December 30, 2025, DAS answer "no" to the first question and declined to answer the second question. In the Petition filed with this Court, Petitioners request the Court declare the DAS declaratory order unlawful, vacate it, and declare that Respondent lacks authority to close the Iowa City research library or to cease maintaining a research center in Iowa City; enjoin Respondent from removing or dispersing collections from the Iowa City research library and order the return of any materials removed in preparation for closure; and declare that DAS erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of Iowa Code §§ 8A.707 and 8A.711. Respondent has denied the allegations of the Petition that are adverse to it, and has set forth the same affirmative defenses as it did in CVCV087253.

Parties' Arguments following Consolidation and on Judicial Review

The parties now have briefed their judicial review arguments.

Petitioner State Historical Society, Inc. filed its initial brief on June 10, 2026. The brief is supported by Exhibit 1—a May 12, 1977 article from the Iowa City Press-Citizen; Exhibit 2—an October 14, 1984 article from the Cedar Rapids Gazette; and Exhibit 3—a June 3, 2026 letter from Unzeitig Construction Co., James D. Unzeitig, to Petitioner's counsel. Petitioner has stated the issues before the Court as being (1) whether DAS erred when it held it has no statutory obligation to maintain a research facility in Iowa City when Iowa Code § 8A.707(2) states that DAS, through the State Historical Society of Iowa (SHSI) "shall" "maintain research centers in Des Moines and Iowa City," and (2) whether DAS erred in refusing to issue a declaratory order on the question of whether its relocation of items donated to the Iowa City research facility violated its duty to use gifts in accordance with the desires of the donor under Iowa Code § 8A.711(1). Petitioner has set forth a summary of the history of itself and of SHSI, and of these actions, all of which the Court incorporates as if set forth in full herein. References to the "Centennial Building" are to the building located 402 Iowa Avenue in Iowa City, which Petitioner describes as opening in 1960 to house and care for a wide variety of historical collections, and which houses a variety of materials, including print materials, special collections, photographs, sound and video recordings, and fine art, many materials of which were donated with the express or implied condition that they remain in Iowa City.

Petitioner first argues that DAS erred when it concluded that Iowa Code § 8A.707 does not require it to maintain the Centennial Building archives and research center, and the declaratory judgment order from DAS finding that closure of the Centennial Building did not violate § 8A.707 should be reversed based on the criteria set forth in Iowa Code § 17A.19(c), (k), and (n). Petitioner claims that DAS's interpretation of § 8A.707 is based on an erroneous interpretation of law because the unambiguous language of § 8A.707 mandates a conclusion that closure of the Centennial Building violates DAS's obligation to maintain a research center in Iowa City, and because DAS's interpretation of its obligations under § 8A.707 violates the purpose of the statute by rendering provisions superfluous. Petitioner also claims that DAS's interpretation of § 8A.707 is not required by law and negatively affects the public interest.

Petitioner asserts that DAS's interpretation of § 8A.707 is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

Petitioner next argues that DAS erred by refusing to issue an order regarding whether its removal of artifacts from Iowa City violated its obligations to comply with donor intent. Petitioner claims that DAS's rationale for failing to answer Petitioner's declaratory petition regarding DAS's statutory obligation to comply with donor intent was an abuse of discretion because the Petition contained sufficient factual allegations that Petitioner would be adversely affected by DAS's failure to answer the question posed; there is no superior alternative proceeding or body with jurisdiction over this matter; the Petition is focused on planning future conduct, not simply the effect of prior conduct; and the Petition does not exclude parties whose positions may be presumed to be adverse to Petitioner's position.

The individually named Petitioners filed their initial brief on June 10, 2026. The brief is supported by declarations from Shelton Stromquist, Glenn Ehrstine, and Jane Howe. These Petitioners also set forth a lengthy statement of the history of what has led to these actions being filed, and the history of the research library, which the Court incorporates as if set forth in full herein. Petitioners argue that Iowa law requires that Respondents maintain an Iowa City research center, and their proposals for a minimal offering of materials at the University of Iowa falls far short of the research center required by Iowa Code § 8A.707(2)(b). Petitioners further argue the Court should appoint a special master to oversee Respondents' compliance with a permanent injunction.

Respondents filed their responsive brief on July 10, 2026, and the brief is supported by the following attachments:

- A—Petition for Declaratory Order filed with DAS by the State Historical Society, Inc.
- B—Petition for Declaratory Order filed with DAS by the individual Petitioners
- C—November 21, 2025 letter from DAS to counsel for the State Historical Society, Inc.
- D—November 21, 2025 letter from DAS to counsel for the individual Petitioners
- E—December 22, 2025 decision from DAS regarding the Petition for Declaratory Order filed the State Historical Society, Inc.
- F—December 22, 2025 decision from DAS regarding the Petition for Declaratory Order filed by the individual Petitioners
- G—Memorandum of Understanding between the University of Iowa and the State of Iowa, acting through DAS for the State Historical Society of Iowa (SHSI)
- H—Affidavit of Anthony Jahn, the State Archivist of Iowa and the Libraries and Archives Bureau Chief.

Respondents set forth their own assessment of the condition of the building at issue, claiming it has numerous safety issues, and background of the procedural history leading to these actions and history of the research library, and the Court incorporates Respondents' statements on these issues as if set forth in full herein. Respondents argue that DAS followed Iowa Code chapter 17A requirements, including that DAS followed proper procedures in issuing the declaratory orders, and DAS used the declaratory orders to interpret laws, not facts. Respondents further argue that the declaratory orders correctly interpreted Iowa Code §

8A.707(2)(b). Respondents claim DAS has interpretive authority over this statute. Respondents also claim DAS correctly determined the statute does not require DAS to permanently keep historical records in the Centennial Building, and DAS correctly determined third parties can help DAS maintain a research center. Finally, Respondents assert the declaratory orders correctly addressed Iowa Code § 8A.711(1), and Petitioners' requested remedies are unreasonable.

Petitioner State Historical Society, Inc. filed its reply brief on July 24, 2026. Petitioner argues that DAS is not clearly vested with authority to interpret "maintain" or "research center" for the purposes of chapter 17A. Petitioner claims DAS misapplies relevant caselaw, the structure of chapter 8A shows DAS is not entitled to deference, and the research center is not saved by archival expertise. Petitioner further argues that, under either standard of review, DAS's interpretation fails. Petitioner contends the Memorandum of Understanding with the University of Iowa demonstrates that DAS is not maintaining a research center. Finally, Petitioner argues that DAS's refusal to answer the donor-intent question was an abuse of discretion.

The individual Petitioners also filed their reply brief on July 24, 2026, and the reply brief is supported by an amended declaration of Mr. Stromquist and a declaration of Kathryn Elizabeth Gourley. The individual Petitioners argue that DAS is not entitled to deference regarding its interpretation of Iowa Code § 8A.707(2)(b), and the plain language of this section requires a functioning research center in Iowa City. Petitioners further argue that the University of Iowa Memorandum of Understanding confirms that DAS has eliminated the Iowa City research center. Petitioners contend that DAS improperly refused to answer the donor-intent question presented under Iowa Code § 8A.711(1), and Respondents' reliance on the former Iowa Code § 303.3 and legislative history is misplaced and does not support the declaratory orders. Petitioners also contend that Respondents' new evidence does not resolve the legal questions before the Court.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioners are entitled to judicial review of this action pursuant to Iowa Code § 17A.19 (2025). "A person or party who has exhausted all adequate administrative remedies and who is aggrieved or adversely affected by any final agency action is entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter." Iowa Code § 17A.19(1) (2025). "Iowa Code section 17A.19(8)(g) authorizes relief from agency action that is 'unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.'" Dico, Inc. v. Emp. Appeal Bd., 576 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 1998). "These terms have established meanings: 'An agency's action is "arbitrary" or "capricious" when it is taken without regard to the law or facts of the case...Agency action is "unreasonable" when it is "clearly against reason and evidence."'" Id. (citing Soo Line R.R. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 688-89 (Iowa 1994)). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the agency action 'rests on grounds or reasons clearly untenable or unreasonable.'" Id. (citing Schoenfeld v. FDL Foods, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Iowa 1997)). The Iowa Supreme Court has stated that an "abuse of discretion is synonymous with unreasonableness, and involves a lack of rationality, focusing on whether the agency has made a decision clearly against reason and evidence." Id. (citing Schoenfeld, 560 N.W.2d at 598). "Section 17A.19[10] provides that a party may successfully challenge an

agency decision when the party's substantial rights have been prejudiced because the agency action 'is unsupported by substantial evidence' or 'is affected by other error of law.'" Titan Tire Corp. v. Emp. Appeal Bd., 641 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Iowa 2003).

Iowa Code § 17A.19(10) states, in relevant part:

10. The court may affirm the agency action or remand to the agency for further proceedings. The Court shall reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate relief from agency action, equitable or legal and including declaratory relief, if it determines that substantial rights of the person seeking judicial relief have been prejudiced because the agency action is any of the following:

...

c. Based upon an erroneous interpretation of a provision of law whose interpretation has not clearly been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.

...

k. Not required by law and its negative impact on the private rights affected is so grossly disproportionate to the benefits accruing to the public interest from that action that it must necessarily be deemed to lack any foundation in rational agency policy.

...

n. Otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

Iowa Code § 17A.19(10) (2025).

"If an agency has been clearly vested with the authority to make factual findings on a particular issue, then a reviewing court can only disturb those factual findings if they are 'not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is reviewed as a whole.'" Burton v. Hilltop Care Center, 813 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Iowa 2012) (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)). "This review is limited to the findings that were actually made by the agency and not other findings that the agency could have made." Id. "When an agency has been clearly vested with the authority to make factual determinations, 'it follows that application of the law to those facts is likewise "vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency."'" Id. (citing Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 465 (Iowa 2004) (quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f))). "When the application of law to fact has been clearly vested in the discretion of an agency, a reviewing court may only disturb the agency's application of the law to the facts of the particular case if that application is 'irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.'" Id. (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m)). "A reviewing court may also be asked to review an agency's interpretation of law." Id. "The level of deference afforded to an agency's interpretations of law depends on whether the authority to interpret that law has 'clearly been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.'" Id. (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)). "If the agency *has not* been clearly vested with the authority to interpret a provision of law, such as a statute, then the reviewing court must reverse the agency's interpretation if it is erroneous." Id. "If the agency *has* been clearly vested with the authority to interpret a statute, then a court may only disturb the interpretation if it is 'irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.'" Id. (citing Iowa

Code § 17A.19(10)(l)). “[I]n determining the level of deference owed to the commissioner, we will not make ‘broad articulations of an agency’s authority.’” Id. (citing Renda v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 784 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Iowa 2010)). “Instead, we consider the agency’s interpretive authority for each particular phrase under consideration.” Id. “We note that the legislature did not require the agency be *expressly* vested with the authority to interpret a statute; instead, the legislature only required the interpretative authority be *clearly* vested in the agency.” Id.

“When determining whether an agency has been clearly vested with the authority to interpret a provision of law,

[w]e do not focus our inquiry on whether the agency does or does not have the broad authority to interpret the act as a whole. Instead, when determining whether the legislature has clearly vested the agency with authority to interpret, ‘each case requires a careful look at the specific language the agency has interpreted as well as the specific duties and authority given to the agency with respect to enforcing particular statutes.’

Id. at 257 (citing Andover Volunteer Fire Dept. v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 787 N.W.2d 75, 79-80 (Iowa 2010)). “When a term is not defined in a statute, but the agency must necessarily interpret the term in order to carry out its duties, we are more likely to conclude the power to interpret the term was clearly vested in the agency.” Id. “This is especially true ‘when the statutory provision being interpreted is a substantive term within the special expertise of the agency.’” Id. (citing Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 14). “However, ‘[w]hen a term has an independent legal definition that is not uniquely within the subject matter expertise of the agency,’ or when the language to be interpreted is ‘found in a statute other than the statute the agency has been tasked with enforcing,’ we are less likely to conclude that the agency has been clearly vested with the authority to interpret that provision of the statute.” Id. (citing Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 14).

Iowa Code § 8A.707 sets forth the powers and duties of the State Historical Society board of directors and DAS. Iowa Code § 8A.707(2) provides:

2. The department *shall*:

a. Have authority to acquire by fee simple title historic properties by gift, purchase, devise, or bequest; preserve, restore, transfer, and administer historic properties; and charge reasonable admission to historic properties.

b. Maintain research centers in Des Moines and Iowa City.

Iowa Code § 8A.707(2) (2025) (emphasis added). The language of this section is clear, and is that DAS “shall” maintain research centers in Des Moines and Iowa City. There is nothing in the section that grants DAS any authority to engage in interpretation of what “maintain” should constitute. Thus, the Court agrees with Petitioners that the correct standard of review of DAS’s interpretation of § 8A.707(2)(b) is for errors at law.

Applying the erroneous interpretation of law standard, the Court concludes that DAS's declaratory judgment orders finding that § 8A.707 was not violated are in error and must be reversed. The language of § 8A.707 is plain and clear. There is no room for interpretation in the language that has been utilized by the legislature in this section. Pursuant to this language, DAS "shall" maintain a research center in Iowa City. "Maintain" is not defined within chapter 8A. The Iowa Supreme Court has held that when "the general assembly chooses to act as its own lexicographer, we are normally bound by its definitions, even if they do not coincide with dictionary or common law definitions." State v. McCollaugh, 5 N.W.3d 620, 623 (Iowa 2024) (citing Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 789 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2010) (acknowledging the significance of the general assembly's choice to define words used within a statute)). "If a statute does not define a term, we construe the statute according to the term's ordinary meaning." State v. Boone, 989 N.W.2d 645, 650 (Iowa 2023). "The ordinary...meaning of the statute's words is dependent on the context and setting in which they are used." Id. (citing In re. Det. of Johnson, 805 N.W.2d 750, 753 (Iowa 2011)). If the text of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, courts do not search for a meaning beyond the express terms of the statute or resort to rules of construction. Id.

Without a definition of "maintain" within chapter 8A, the Court applies the ordinary meaning of the word, and is persuaded by Petitioner State Historical Society Inc.'s citations to the Merriam-Webster and Black's Law Dictionaries, in which "maintain" is defined as "to keep in an existing state (as of repair, efficiency, or validity; preserve from failure or decline" and "to care for (property) for purposes of operational productivity or appearance; to engage in general repair and upkeep," respectively. Thus, applying these definitions to "maintain" as used in chapter 8A, the Court agrees with Petitioner that DAS is obligated to "care for," "keep in an existing state," "repair," and "preserve from decline" a research center in Iowa City. While the phrase "research center" consists of two words not specifically defined in these dictionaries, the Court is persuaded by and will utilize Petitioner's offering that, when the two words are considered together, it is reasonable to define them as a "facility providing a place for" research in Iowa City.

With these definitions having been adopted, the Court concludes DAS has violated § 8A.707 by deciding to close the Centennial Building and not offering a replacement research facility in Iowa City. DAS does have an obligation to maintain a research center in Iowa City, and the statute does not permit DAS to have another entity maintain the research center. Even if § 8A.707 is determined to be ambiguous, the Court concludes that DAS is not engaging in a proper interpretation of this section pursuant to its agreement with the University of Iowa to take the place of the Iowa City research center. It is DAS, specifically, that is required to maintain a research center in Iowa City, and there is nothing to suggest that the University intends to maintain a research center regarding the materials at issue, with the type of access that is available at the Centennial Building. The Court is not persuaded by Respondents' reliance on the Renda case or on City of Marion v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue & Finance, 643 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 2002). These cases do not support a legal conclusion regarding construction of the words "maintain" and "research center," and do not discuss chapter 8A. Mr. Jahn's affidavit, while informative and while he has extensive credentials related to archival expertise, does not overcome the ordinary meaning of the phrase "research center."

Applying the not required by law and negative impact to the public interest standard, the Court further concludes that DAS's interpretation of § 8A.707 also violates § 17A.19(10). Respondents claim that the condition of the Centennial Building is so poor and physical maintenance thereof is so expensive that the research center must be closed. However, Petitioners have offered contrary evidence, through the Unzeitig attachment, that the building actually is in good condition and can be utilized for years to come if it undergoes routine maintenance. If the historical materials within the building are moved, they may be damaged or destroyed, which would not be in the public interest. The closure of the Centennial Building is not required by law and would have a negative impact to the public interest.

Applying the otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion standard, the parties generally dispute what facts DAS could consider and adjudicate in making its declaratory orders. There also is some dispute regarding what the effect is of the parties' communications leading up to these actions being filed, and what actions DAS will take or not take going forward. The Court is not as persuaded that this standard supports reversal of DAS's decision, but because the other two standards are met, concludes this is not fatal to Petitioners' ultimate arguments.

The Court next addresses the question of whether DAS erred by refusing to issue an order regarding whether its removal of artifacts from Iowa City violated its obligations to comply with donor intent. Iowa Code § 17A.9(5)(d) provides that "[w]ithin thirty days after receipt of a petition for a declaratory order, an agency, in writing, shall do one of the following:...d. Decline to issue a declaratory order, stating the reasons for its action." Iowa Code § 17A.9(5)(d) (2025). The Iowa Administrative Code previously included a provision regarding declaratory orders, titled "Refusal to issue order," which was rescinded effective July 1, 2026, after the parties' dispute was presented to this Court and after DAS had made its original decision. Iowa Admin. Code r. 11-8.9. This rule previously had provided that DAS could decline to issue a declaratory ruling if a petition did not set forth facts sufficient to demonstrate that the petitioner would be aggrieved or adversely affected by the failure of DAS to issue an order. It also provided that DAS could decline to issue a declaratory ruling where questions presented by the petition would more properly be resolved in a different type of proceeding or by another body with jurisdiction over the matter. Finally, it provided, in relevant part, that DAS could decline to issue a declaratory ruling if a petition is not based on facts calculated to aid in the planning of future conduct but instead is based solely on prior conduct in an effort to establish the effect of the conduct or to challenge an agency decision already made.

In reviewing the petitions submitted to DAS, the Court concludes that the petitions were clear in what they sought and in their statement of the specific interests the Petitioners had in the Centennial Building archives, and that Petitioners would be aggrieved and adversely affected if DAS failed to issue an order. The questions presented related directly to DAS's statutory obligations under chapter 8A. Petitioners raised issues in their petitions regarding the effect of future transactions, particularly the plan for moving all of the artifacts out of the Centennial Building. There was not a proper basis for DAS to refuse to answer the request for declaratory judgment regarding whether removal of artifacts from the Centennial Building violates DAS's statutory obligation to comply with donor intent.

Petitioners' requested relief on judicial review should be granted, and Respondents' decisions regarding the State Historical Society in Iowa City should be reversed.

RULING

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the decisions of DAS related to the petitions for declaratory orders filed by Petitioners are reversed. Court costs are assessed to the State Historical Society of Iowa and the Iowa Department of Administrative Services. The Court declines to award any attorney fees at this time, or to appoint a special master. If Petitioners believe there is authority to support an attorney fee award, an application for attorney fees may be filed for the Court's review. In light of the Court's ruling, the Court is granting counsel for the parties 30 days in which to confer in good faith and determine whether they can agree on language effectuating the reversal of the DAS decisions and implementing a ruling in this matter. If the parties can agree, they should circulate a proposed order for consideration of all counsel and submit that proposed order for the Court's review before the expiration of the 30 day period. If they cannot agree, counsel for each party shall submit a proposed order for the Court's review, and the Court will determine what language to approve. The Court then will determine whether it is necessary and practical to appoint a special master.

Clerk to notify.



State of Iowa Courts

Case Number
CVCV087307
Type:

Case Title
SHELTON STROMQUIST ET AL. V DAS
Other Order

So Ordered

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "David M. Cox".

David M. Cox, District Court Judge,
Sixth Judicial District of Iowa

Electronically signed on 2026-09-17 14:46:04