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6/10/2026

Tampa Sports Authority
Attention: Eric Hart, CEO
One Buccaneer Place
Tampa, FL 33607

**CC: TSA General Counsel, Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners,
Hillsborough County Attorney Julia Mandell, Hillsborough County Administrator Bonnie
Wise, City of Tampa Mayor Jane Castor**

**RE: June 2, 2026 Board Vote; Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest; Request for the Voluntary
Resignation of Conflicted Members and, Failing Resignation, Board Action to Effect Their
Removal**

Dear Chair and Members of the Tampa Sports Authority Board:

As a taxpayer and citizen of Hillsborough County, I write regarding the Tampa Sports Authority (TSA) board's vote of June 2, 2026, directing staff to draft correspondence to the Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners and the Tampa City Council urging that funding priority be given to the approximately \$1 billion Raymond James Stadium renovation for the Tampa Bay Buccaneers over the Tampa Bay Rays' proposed \$2.3 billion ballpark at the Hillsborough College campus. Public records establish that multiple board members who participated in that vote held undisclosed real property and business interests that could be materially affected by its outcome. None of those members disclosed an interest before the meeting. None recused. The motion itself was made by a member whose entities hold Ybor City commercial property.

The purpose of this letter is direct: the conflicted members identified below, Tony Muniz Jr., Andrew "Andy" Scaglione, Roland Patrick Manteiga, and Joseph William Jordon-Robinson, should voluntarily resign from the TSA board.

Their continued service, after participating without disclosure in a vote that touched their own financial interests, is incompatible with the public trust the Authority holds. If any of them declines to resign within fourteen (14) days of the date of this letter, the board should use every tool available to it to effect their removal, including a formal board resolution requesting resignation, a formal request to the appointing authorities to initiate suspension and removal proceedings under Florida Statutes § 112.501, and referral of the matter to the Florida

Commission on Ethics pursuant to § 112.324. The specific conflicts for each member are detailed below with primary-source documentation.

I. THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS

A. Florida Statutes, Chapter 112

As directors of an independent special district, TSA board members are “public officers” subject to the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees, Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes. Because they hold their seats by appointment rather than election, they are also “appointed public officers” within the meaning of § 112.3143(1)(b). The statute imposes three obligations relevant here, each escalating in stringency.

1. Voting-conflict prohibition. Under § 112.3143(3)(a), no county, municipal, or other local public officer may vote on any measure that would inure to his special private gain or loss, or to that of a principal by whom he is retained, a relative, or a business associate. A “special private gain or loss” is one particular to the officer: a benefit or detriment he experiences differently from the public at large, such as the effect of an official action on the value or development prospects of real property he owns. An officer who abstains under this provision must publicly state the nature of his interest before the vote and, within fifteen days after the vote occurs, must file a Memorandum of Voting Conflict (CE Form 8B) with the person responsible for recording the minutes, who incorporates it into the minutes.

2. Heightened rule for appointed officers. Section 112.3143(4) goes further for appointed officers like TSA directors. Because they answer to no electorate, the Legislature did not stop at requiring abstention from the vote; it barred the conflicted appointee from any participation in the matter without disclosure first. An appointed officer may not participate in any matter that would inure to his special private gain or loss without first disclosing the nature of his interest, where “participate” means any attempt to influence the decision by oral or written communication, whether made by the officer or at his direction. That disclosure must be made in writing, filed with the person responsible for recording the minutes prior to the meeting at which the matter will be considered, and incorporated into the minutes. The statute provides only narrow fallback mechanics where an interest first becomes apparent at the meeting itself (oral disclosure on the record, followed by a written memorandum within fifteen days), and none of those mechanics was invoked here. The practical effect: an appointed officer who has made no prior written disclosure does not make the motion, does not speak to the matter, does not lobby colleagues, and does not vote. And even where the interest has been properly disclosed, the officer must still abstain from the vote itself.

3. Supporting obligations. Section 112.313(6) prohibits a public officer from corruptly using his official position to secure a special privilege or benefit for himself or others. Section 112.3145 requires each officer to file an annual Form 1 disclosing his financial interests, including real property holdings, fully and accurately; the form exists precisely so that the public

can detect conflicts of the kind at issue here. Violations of any of these provisions are enforceable by the Florida Commission on Ethics, with penalties including removal from office, suspension, public censure and reprimand, restitution, and civil penalties of up to \$20,000 per violation (§ 112.317).

B. The TSA Code of Ethics

Chapter 112 is the floor, not the ceiling. The statutory prohibitions turn on defined thresholds, a “special private gain or loss” for the participation rules, corrupt intent for misuse of position, and a member might argue at the margins about whether a given interest crosses them. The TSA’s own Code of Ethics dispenses with those thresholds. Under Paragraph 1, board members must avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest, much less an actual conflict. The question under the Code is not whether a member can ultimately prove his vote produced a quantifiable private gain; it is whether a reasonably prudent, fully informed observer would conclude that his participation created an appearance of conflict. A member whose conduct survives the statutory test can still fail this one, and a member who fails the statutory test fails this one by definition.

The Code’s remaining provisions reinforce that higher bar. Members may not accept anything of value that would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe their independence of judgment has been compromised (Paragraph 2); may not use their official position to obtain special privileges for themselves or others (Paragraph 3); may not invest in any enterprise that creates a conflict between private interest and public duty (Paragraph 7); and may not hold any financial or other interest that conflicts with their duties (Paragraph 11). Members must provide timely and accurate financial disclosures (Paragraph 12). And the Code leaves no room for a member to plead uncertainty: a member unsure whether a proposed action is ethical must consult general counsel or seek a Commission advisory opinion before acting (Paragraph 14). Measured against the statutory baseline or against the Authority’s own more demanding standard, the conduct described below fails.

II. BACKGROUND

The question of where the Tampa Bay Rays would build a Tampa ballpark has a history, and that history is essential to understanding the June 2 vote. In October 2017, the Rays’ site search publicly settled on a location on or near Palm Avenue in Ybor City. The market reacted immediately: WTSP’s 10 Investigates documented that “property values in and around the targeted area soared, providing instant equity to developers who knew to buy up land in West Ybor.” Speculators and existing landowners alike stood to benefit, whether through appreciation of nearby parcels or through the premiums public agencies pay when assembling land and right-of-way for a major civic project. That effort collapsed in late 2018 without a deal, but Ybor City’s candidacy never fully receded from the regional conversation; a 2022 TSA-commissioned study was still projecting “more than \$20 million in real estate growth to the region” from an Ybor City stadium (FOX 13, Feb. 7, 2022).

By 2026, the discussion had moved across town. The current proposal, memorialized in the May 2026 MOU, places the ballpark at Hillsborough College's campus in the Drew Park/Westshore District, miles from Ybor City, and commits roughly \$976 million in public funds (\$796 million county, \$180 million city). The non-binding MOU passed the County Commission 5–2 on May 20 and the City Council 4–3 on May 22, leaving final binding agreements to be negotiated. The two sites are, as a practical matter, mutually exclusive: a Dale Mabry ballpark secures the Rays' long-term home for a generation and ends Ybor City's prospects of landing the stadium, while delay or failure of the Dale Mabry deal leaves the question open, and with it whatever value proximity to a future stadium site may hold for nearby landowners.

It was into this posture that the TSA's June 2 vote arrived: a formal institutional statement, from the public body that has managed Tampa sports facilities since 1965, urging the County and City to prioritize the competing Raymond James renovation at the precise moment the Rays' binding agreements were being negotiated. To be clear, owning property in Ybor City does not, by itself, establish a conflict of interest, and this letter does not suggest that it does. But the history above is why the location of a member's holdings cannot be ignored either: where a member's real estate sits in an area whose fortunes have demonstrably risen and fallen with the stadium question, a vote bearing on which site prevails is precisely the kind of matter the disclosure obligations of § 112.3143(4), and the more demanding appearance standard of the TSA's own Code, exist to surface and resolve before the member participates. Whether a particular member's interests crossed that line is a member-specific question, and it is taken up member by member, on the documented record, in the section that follows.

III. THE CONFLICTED MEMBERS

A. Tony Muniz Jr.

Mr. Muniz made the motion at the June 2 meeting to prioritize Raymond James Stadium over the Rays ballpark, telling the board, "I think we should let the county know we're concerned... There's only so much dollars we have out there and we need to take care of our current tenants" (WUSF, June 3, 2026). Making the motion, as opposed to merely voting, was the initiating act that placed the TSA's institutional authority behind a position potentially affecting or involving Ybor City land values.

What Mr. Muniz did not tell the board is that his own entities hold commercial property in Central Ybor. Florida's Division of Corporations (Sunbiz) records confirm Cayman Properties, Inc. as an active Florida profit corporation with Tony Muniz Jr. serving as President, Secretary, Treasurer, Director, and Registered Agent at 8405 N. Edison Ave., Tampa, with annual reports current through 2026. Hillsborough County Property Appraiser records confirm that Cayman Properties, Inc. co-owns 1520 E. 7th Avenue, Tampa, a single-story commercial parcel in the Central Ybor Area south of I-4, assessed at \$218,257, whose mailing address (8405 N. Edison Ave.) is identical to the address of Mr. Muniz's Gabriel Properties. HCPA lists "Cayman

Properties Inc / Lava Properties Inc” as co-owners; Sunbiz confirms Aliva Properties, Inc. at the same Edison Avenue address with Mr. Muniz as Registered Agent, almost certainly the same entity recorded under a transposed name variant. At least fifteen additional Muniz real-estate entities (among them Gabriel Homes, Gabriel Properties, Central Properties, Muniz Holdings, TMJ Investments of Tampa, and Edison Properties) are registered to the same address.

Mr. Muniz’s 2024 Form 1 financial disclosure (filed May 29, 2025) lists approximately fifteen real-estate entities as secondary income sources yet states “N/A” in the Real Property section, omitting the Ybor City parcel entirely. He made no disclosure before the June 2 meeting, did not recuse, and no Form 8B for him appears in the public record. By advocating against the Dale Mabry deal, his motion must be examined in the context of his Ybor City land holdings, and the value of those holdings in the broader discussion around the Rays stadium location. As the motion’s maker, his participation is the most direct violation of § 112.3143(4)’s prohibition on participating in a conflicted matter without prior written disclosure, and it violates the TSA Code’s appearance standard (Paragraph 1), its prohibitions on conflicting investments and interests (Paragraphs 7 and 11), and its disclosure requirement (Paragraph 12), together with Fla. Stat. §§ 112.3143(4) and 112.3145.

B. Andrew “Andy” Scaglione

Mr. Scaglione serves as the board’s Secretary/Treasurer and as Chair of its Finance Committee. In that role he led the April 2026 scrutiny of the Rays deal, questioning AECOM analyst Dillon Gilman on Community Investment Tax use, interest costs (“it’s not a \$1 billion subsidy, it’s \$1.4 billion when you add interest”), and affordable-housing assumptions, shaping the TSA’s official posture in the weeks before the June 2 vote (WTSP, April 2026). He then participated in the June 2 vote without disclosure or recusal.

Mr. Scaglione’s Ybor City holdings are extensive and documented. Hillsborough County Property Appraiser records confirm three parcels in the Central Ybor Area south of I-4, each held through an entity registered to his business address at 15438 N. Florida Ave., Suite 102, with Mr. Scaglione as Manager and/or Registered Agent: 1801 E. 5th Ave., retail services, assessed at \$294,962, held by SCAG-CAP-BUC LLC; 1607 N. 18th St., multi-family residential, assessed at \$329,969, held by Scaglione 5th Avenue Apartments LLC; and 1402 E. 2nd Ave., warehouse, assessed at \$957,659, held by 1402 East 2nd Avenue LLC. Together, the three parcels carry approximately \$1.58 million in confirmed Ybor City assessed value. Florida Politics (March 31, 2026) reports that he “owns or controls at least 35 properties in the Tampa area, including several in or near Ybor City,” and that during the 2017–2018 negotiations he sought to sell an Ybor parcel at an “obnoxious premium,” “significantly higher than appraised value.”

His conduct history makes the conflict unmistakable. In September 2017, attorney Irwin Raji texted Commissioner Ken Hagan: “*As an FYI, Andy wants in on row \$\$\$*” (WTSP 10 Investigates, Nov. 2018), documenting that Mr. Scaglione sought right-of-way acquisition profits from the Ybor City stadium project while serving on the TSA. He filed a conflict-of-interest

disclosure with the TSA only on November 26, 2018, after the media exposed his private communications, and the TSA announced he would recuse from future Ybor-related actions, a commitment he violated by participating in the June 2 vote on the same substantive issue without disclosure. His 2024 Form 1 (filed July 1, 2025) discloses only a single Channelside Drive and a business entity, Discipline Holdings, LLC, despite the 28-plus entities and 35-plus properties documented in public records, notwithstanding that Form 1 requires parcel-level disclosure of real property held through closely-held entities and that Sunbiz records show his other parcel-owning LLCs (SCAG-CAP-BUC LLC, Scaglione 5th Avenue Apartments LLC, and 1402 East 2nd Avenue LLC) as separately registered entities, not subsidiaries of Discipline Holdings. Specifically, the Form 1 instructions state “The location or description of the property should be sufficient to enable anyone who looks at the form to identify the property. A street address should be used, if one exists.” No CY2025 Form 1 appears to have been filed as of the date this letter was written. "Florida Politics further reports that he sought to join the Rays' new ownership group and was rebuffed over conflict concerns (as one source put it, “If ever there were a reason to oppose a deal, being cut out of it sure seems like a plausible candidate”), and that he lobbied elected officials against the deal and publicly opposed it in writing (Tampa Bay Business Journal, April 9, 2026).

Taken together, the record shows documented Ybor City real estate, a documented 2017 attempt to profit from the Ybor stadium's land acquisition, a reactive recusal commitment later abandoned, materially deficient financial disclosures, and active participation in shaping and casting the June 2 vote. That conduct violates the TSA Code's appearance standard and its prohibitions on compromised independence, special privileges, conflicting investments, and conflicting interests (Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 7, and 11), its disclosure requirement (Paragraph 12), and its obligation to seek guidance before acting (Paragraph 14), together with Fla. Stat. §§ 112.3143(4), 112.313(6), and 112.3145.

C. Roland Patrick Manteiga

Mr. Manteiga, a BOCC-appointed member whose term runs through June 2029, voted on the June 2 motion. His primary business and his real property sit in the heart of historic Ybor City. Sunbiz confirms La Gaceta Publishing, Inc. with Patrick Manteiga as officer and director at 3210 E. 7th Avenue, Tampa, La Gaceta's published contact address. Hillsborough County Property Appraiser records confirm that PMAC LLC owns 3206 E. 7th Ave., a mixed-use warehouse parcel in the East Ybor Area south of I-4 assessed at \$734,512, with a mailing address of 3210 E. 7th Ave. (the La Gaceta address). The building complex spans 3206–3210 E. 7th Ave. His own Form 1 discloses the 3206 E. 7th Ave. property and income from La Gaceta Publishing and the Judicial Campaign Group (2000 E. 12th Ave.), all in or near Ybor City, and he previously served on the board of the Ybor City Development Corporation, giving him direct institutional involvement in Ybor City redevelopment planning.

The 2017–2018 stadium footprint on Palm Avenue was adjacent to this historic commercial strip; an Ybor City stadium would have concentrated infrastructure spending, foot traffic, and development pressure directly around his property and business. The June 2 vote to prioritize the competing Raymond James project, and effectively to oppose the Dale Mabry deal that would extinguish Ybor City’s stadium prospects, serves the private interest of preserving that optionality. Mr. Manteiga made no disclosure before the meeting and did not recuse. Under the TSA Code’s appearance standard (Paragraph 1), a reasonably prudent observer familiar with his Ybor City business location, property ownership, and YCDC service would conclude that his participation created, at minimum, an appearance of conflict, in violation of TSA Code Paragraphs 1, 7, and 11 and Fla. Stat. §§ 112.3143(4) and 112.3145.

D. Joseph William Jordon-Robinson, P.E.

Mr. Robinson voted on the June 2 motion. His financial interests sit on the other side of the ledger, in the West Tampa/Dale Mabry corridor that the vote favored. His 2025 Form 1, filed June 1, 2026, the day before the vote, discloses five parcels in West Tampa near the Dale Mabry campus and Raymond James Stadium. He is President and CEO of RHC and Associates, Inc., Consulting Engineers, which holds a City of Tampa professional services contract under RFQ 25-D-00400 A (Resolution 2025-54), a five-year work-order agreement for engineering, architectural, and surveying services expiring April 2028. And he served for years as Chair of the West Tampa Community Redevelopment Area Citizens Advisory Committee (2015–2020 and 2023–2025, with service as Vice-Chair between), exercising authority over land use in the same corridor where he holds personal rental properties.

The June 2 vote prioritized \$1 billion in renovation spending at Raymond James Stadium, located in the corridor where Mr. Robinson owns property and where his engineering firm holds an active city contract. Stadium renovation projects generate substantial engineering work orders across structural, civil, MEP, and surveying disciplines, and concentrated public investment in the corridor inures to the benefit of nearby rental holdings. Whether a Form 1 filed the day before the vote satisfies § 112.3143(4)’s requirement of pre-meeting written disclosure of the specific interest in the matter is, at best, a serious open question; in any event, he made no disclosure at the meeting itself and did not recuse. His participation violates the TSA Code’s appearance standard and its prohibitions on conflicting investments and interests (Paragraphs 1, 2, 7, and 11) and its disclosure requirement (Paragraph 12), together with Fla. Stat. §§ 112.3143(4), 112.313(6), and 112.3145.

IV. PROCEDURAL FAILURES

Contemporaneous news accounts (WUSF, June 3, 2026; WTSP, June 2, 2026; Sports Business Journal, June 3, 2026; Tampa Bay Times, June 2, 2026) establish the procedural record. The motion was made by Mr. Muniz, the member with undisclosed Ybor City holdings. The vote passed near-unanimously; only Alan Clendenin, Tampa City Council Chair, dissented. No

member disclosed a conflict before the meeting and none recused, despite Mr. Scaglione's documented 2018 recusal commitment on the same issue and despite the property interests of Muniz, Manteiga, and Robinson described above, some of which were not properly disclosed on Form 1 filings before the vote. No Form 8B (Memorandum of Voting Conflict) filed by any member in connection with the vote is publicly recorded; the fifteen-day filing deadline is June 17, 2026. And the vote occurred at a critical inflection point, after the non-binding MOU passed the County 5–2 on May 20 and the City Council 4–3 on May 22, but before final binding agreements were executed.

V. REQUESTED ACTION: RESIGNATION, AND FAILING THAT, REMOVAL

The appropriate remedy for participation in official action burdened by undisclosed personal financial interest is not a policy memo. It is the departure of the conflicted members from the board. Accordingly, I respectfully request the following:

- **Voluntary resignation.** Directors Muniz, Scaglione, Manteiga, and Jordon-Robinson should each voluntarily resign from the TSA board. Resignation is the swiftest way to restore the Authority's credibility and spare the board, the appointing bodies, and the public a protracted enforcement process.
- **Interim recusal.** Pending resignation or removal, each named member should immediately recuse from all TSA deliberations, votes, committee work, and written communications relating to the Rays stadium proposals, Raymond James Stadium funding, or any matter that could affect Ybor City or West Tampa property values.
- **Board resolution calling for resignation.** If any named member declines to resign, the board should adopt a public resolution formally requesting that member's resignation and stating the grounds.
- **Formal request to the appointing authorities for removal.** The TSA cannot remove its own members. The Authority's Amended and Restated Bylaws provide for the selection of members by outside appointing authorities, for the annual election of officers, and for resignations and vacancies, but they contain no censure, suspension, or removal mechanism for a sitting member (Bylaws, Arts. I–II), and the Code of Ethics supplies none either. The board should therefore formally transmit the documented record to each member's appointing authority (under Article I, Section 1.01 of the Bylaws: the Board of County Commissioners for county appointees, the Mayor of Tampa with the concurrence of the City Council for city appointees, or the Governor, as applicable) and request that the appointing authority initiate suspension and removal proceedings under Florida Statutes § 112.501 for misfeasance and malfeasance in office. The County Attorney's Office has already been directed to advise the BOCC on its authority to remove a county-appointed TSA member mid-term; the board should not wait to be acted upon.

- **Referral to the Florida Commission on Ethics.** The board should formally refer the matter to the Florida Commission on Ethics pursuant to § 112.324, transmitting the June 2 meeting packet and minutes together with the documentary record identified in the sources listed at the end of this letter.
- **Prospective conflicts and recusal policy.** Regardless of the outcome for the named members, the board should adopt a formal written policy governing the identification and written disclosure of conflicts before each vote under § 112.3143(4) and the TSA Code; standing recusal obligations for members with known interests in Ybor City or other ballpark-adjacent areas; and a clear procedure for members to seek General Counsel's guidance before voting on matters that may implicate their financial interests, consistent with TSA Code Paragraph 14.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Tampa Sports Authority holds public trust on behalf of the residents of Hillsborough County and the City of Tampa. Its advice to elected bodies on the allocation of hundreds of millions of public dollars carries weight only if the process that produced that advice is beyond question. The June 2, 2026 vote, on the documented record presented here, is not beyond question. Four members, including the motion's maker and the chair of the finance committee, participated in a vote that protected or advanced the value of their own proximate real estate and business interests. None disclosed. None recused. The board's own Code of Ethics was ignored.

The honorable course for the members named above is to resign. If they will not, the board owes it to the public to act: to call for their resignation on the record, to place the documented record before the appointing authorities with a request for removal under § 112.501, and to refer the matter to the Florida Commission on Ethics. I am available to provide additional information or documentation at the board's request.

Respectfully submitted,

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SOURCES

- TSA Board Meeting Agenda Packet, June 2, 2026 (official PDF). TSA Granicus / Public Records.
- Tampa Sports Authority, Amended and Restated Bylaws (readopted and revised 2022). TSA Executive Committee agenda packet, May 24, 2022.
- Form 1 Statement of Financial Interests, Tony Muniz Jr. (CY2024, filed May 29, 2025). Florida Commission on Ethics EFDMS.
- Form 1 Statement of Financial Interests, Andrew Scaglione (CY2024, filed July 1, 2025). Florida Commission on Ethics EFDMS.
- Form 1 Statement of Financial Interests, Roland Patrick Manteiga (CY2024, filed June 25, 2025). Florida Commission on Ethics EFDMS.
- Form 1 Statement of Financial Interests, Joseph W. Jordon-Robinson (CY2025, filed June 1, 2026). Florida Commission on Ethics EFDMS.
- Hillsborough County Property Appraiser parcel record, Cayman Properties Inc / Lava Properties Inc, 1520 E. 7th Ave. HCPA GIS (retrieved June 4, 2026).
- Hillsborough County Property Appraiser parcel record, SCAG-CAP-BUC LLC, 1801 E. 5th Ave. HCPA GIS (retrieved June 4, 2026).
- Hillsborough County Property Appraiser parcel record, Scaglione 5th Avenue Apartments LLC, 1607 N. 18th St. HCPA GIS (retrieved June 4, 2026).
- Hillsborough County Property Appraiser parcel record, 1402 East 2nd Avenue LLC, 1402 E. 2nd Ave. HCPA GIS (retrieved June 4, 2026).
- Hillsborough County Property Appraiser parcel record, PMAC LLC, 3206 E. 7th Ave. HCPA GIS (retrieved June 4, 2026).
- Florida Division of Corporations (Sunbiz), Cayman Properties, Inc. (Doc. V51892), Muniz as President/Secretary/Treasurer/Director and Registered Agent.
- Florida Division of Corporations (Sunbiz), Aliva Properties, Inc. (Doc. P020000197920), Muniz as Registered Agent.
- Florida Division of Corporations (Sunbiz), SCAG-CAP-BUC LLC (Doc. L11000078021), Scaglione as Manager/Registered Agent.
- Florida Division of Corporations (Sunbiz), Discipline Holdings LLC (Doc. L12000161516), Scaglione as Manager/Registered Agent.
- Florida Division of Corporations (Sunbiz), Scaglione 5th Avenue Apartments LLC (Doc. L12000161769).
- Florida Division of Corporations (Sunbiz), 1402 East 2nd Avenue LLC (Doc. L14000180913).
- Florida Division of Corporations (Sunbiz), La Gaceta Publishing, Inc., Manteiga as officer, 3210 E. 7th Ave.
- WTSP 10 Investigates (Nov. 2018), reporting on the September 2017 “Andy wants in on row \$\$\$” text message and post-announcement Ybor City property values.
- Florida Politics (March 31, 2026), reporting on Scaglione property holdings, the “obnoxious premium” sale attempt, and exclusion from the Rays ownership group.
- WUSF (June 3, 2026), account of the June 2, 2026 TSA board vote (Muniz motion; Clendenin dissent).
- WTSP (April 2026), coverage of the April 2026 TSA Finance Committee meeting chaired by Scaglione.

Tampa Bay Business Journal (April 9, 2026), Scaglione written statement opposing Community Investment Tax use.

Tampa Sports Authority, Meet the Board page (Scaglione, Secretary/Treasurer, BOCC appointee, term June 2027). tampasportsauthority.com/meet-the-board.

Tampa Sports Authority, Board Member Biographies (Robinson, West Tampa CRA Chair 2015–2020 and 2023–2025; RHC and Associates). tampasportsauthority.com/board-member-biographies.

City of Tampa procurement, RFQ 25-D-00400 A and Resolution 2025-54 (RHC and Associates professional services contract). [Tampa.gov](https://tampa.gov).

FOX 13 (Feb. 7, 2022), TSA-commissioned study projecting \$20 million-plus in real estate growth from an Ybor City stadium.

WTSP (Nov. 2018), reporting that property values “soared” in Ybor City after the October 2017 stadium site announcement.

Feng & Humphreys (2012), College of the Holy Cross REAP Working Paper: property values increase approximately 1.75% for each 10% decrease in distance to a sports facility.

Florida Politics (June 2026), Commissioner Christine Miller directs County Attorney review of authority to remove TSA appointees.